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From Fancy Amoeba to Fallible Self




1 A perennial concern among Peirce commentators has been the articulation of Peirce’s
model  of  individual  selfhood which underwrites his  notion of  self-control.  A sticking
point for most accounts is that Peirce seems to characterize the self along two different
lines,  at  times describing it  as  a sign and produced by a community while at  others
characterizing  it  primarily  in  terms  of  embodiment  and  continuity  with  the  rest  of
nature. However, if we adopt a view of Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics along the lines
of what I call his “Darwinianized Hegelism,” then Peirce’s speaking about the self in these
apparently contrasting ways is precisely what we would expect. In this paper, I draw on
one of Peirce’s unpublished manuscripts (MS 329) to trace the development of his theory
of the self in terms afforded by both aspects of his metaphysics (the Darwinian and the
Hegelian),  beginning  with  the  biological  origins  of  consciousness  (the  condition  for
selfhood on the level of the species), and then proceeding to his semiotic account of the
cultural and linguistic formation of cognition and “personality” (Peirce’s favored term for
those aspects of selfhood which are not reducible to biology alone). In doing this, I show
that fallibilism is a crucial element in both lines of development and reemerges as part of
the organizing principle of the joint workings of both processes. The final account hints
at a promising connection between Peirce and Josiah Royce on this theme (an idea which
I introduce, but do not pursue in this paper).
 
II. Piecing Together Peircean Selfhood
2 With regard to the individual self, Peirce is most known for a model which is cast largely
in negative terms:  “since his  separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and
error,” Peirce says, the individual person, “so far as he is anything apart from his fellows,
and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation” (W 2: 241-2). Peirce will hold to
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this characterization throughout his career, even in the mature philosophy which many
take to exhibit a significant departure from his earlier views. In a letter to Josiah Royce,
dated June 30, 1913, Peirce says that
I came to the conclusion…that the only thing distinctive of volition is a peculiar
consciousness of two-ness, distension [distention between a sharply-focused object
that volition ‘objects’ to, though it can’t intend to abolish since intention involves
more than volition and a pushed-back back-ground that we call ‘Myself’] between
the  sharply  focussed  [sic.]  object  and  the  pushed-back  background  Self;  and  I
believe there is no other consciousness of the Self. (as cited in Oppenheim 1993:
241-2)1
3 In this later formulation, Peirce emphasizes the primacy of Secondness in the experience
of our own selves; we are made aware of our selves by way of the resistance of reality.
This  is  in  keeping  with  Peirce’s  understanding  of  experience  as  teaching  by  way  of
surprise, and consisting of “forcible modification of our ways of thinking” by way of “the
influence  of  the  world  of  fact”  (EP2:  370).  Consequently,  “all  the  actual  character  of
consciousness is merely the sense of the shock of the non-ego upon us. Just as a calm sea
sleeps except where its rollers dash upon the land” (CP 8.265-266). This is,  of course,
another way of saying that the individual self is characterized by its fallibility, that the
beliefs which comprise its habits of (potential) action could be false and would then be
met with resistance by reality. To say that this is the only “consciousness of the Self” is to
say that we are only conscious of ourselves as fallible.
4 But does Peirce also provide a positive model of the self,  one capable of meeting the
objection raised by Richard Bernstein, that Peirce fails to provide a “coherent theory of
the self  which would make sense of  the idea of  ‘self-control’”  (Bernstein 1971:  197)?
Moreover,  does  he  provide  a  model  that  has  anything  to  offer  contemporary
philosophical concerns such as naturalism? The answer to these questions, I believe, is
both yes and no; Peirce does sketch the beginnings of such a model, one that takes the
individual self to be a sign initially defined by its community. However, the outline is
scattered and incomplete. A more satisfactory model requires extending this outline and
might, I think, be found in the mature thought of Josiah Royce, which demonstrates a
significant Peircean influence. Before turning to such an account, however, we would do
well to look, first, at its foundation, the model of selfhood as it is presented in Peirce’s
own philosophy.
5 A perennial concern among Peirce commentators has been the articulation of Peirce’s
model  of  individual  selfhood which underwrites his  notion of  self-control.  A sticking
point for most accounts is that Peirce seems to characterize the self along two different
lines, at times describing it as a sign and with respect to a community while at others
characterizing  it  primarily  in  terms  of  embodiment  and  continuity  with  the  rest  of
nature. However, if we adopt a view of Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics along the lines
of what I call his “Darwinianized Hegelism,” then Peirce’s speaking about the self in these
apparently  contrasting  ways  is  precisely  what  we  would  expect.2 Given  that  his
metaphysics draws on both a Darwinian-styled model of chance-driven biology and a
Hegelian-like account of the evolution of reason and culture, it follows that the Peircean
self would emerge out of an interaction of these two processes. In fact, this may be the
most significant motivating principle of his cosmology, which, it has been noted, tends
toward  the  anthropomorphic.  That  is,  Peirce  synthesizes  Darwinian  and  Hegelian
evolutions because each is, taken alone, insufficient for describing both the natural world
(conceived in terms that  are independent  of  human thought  and culture)  as  well  as
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human institutions,  practices  and meanings which are of  central  concern for  human
persons. By drawing on a line of thought that is isomorphic with Hegel’s own (although,
according  to  Peirce,  developed  independently  of  any  Hegelian  influence)  Peirce  is
pointing to the inadequacies of the Darwinian model in accounting for culture and its
artifacts, notably human selves; these cannot be reduced to mere biology or the operation
of chance which Peirce takes to be the governing process in natural selection. However,
in his frequent criticisms of Hegel’s relation to science – a view he often con- trasts with
that of Darwin – Peirce is showing that biological development and the world revealed by
the natural sciences themselves cannot be reduced to the evolution of culture, Mind or
Geist. To employ this reductive strategy would indeed be overly anthropomorphic, and
would  ignore  both  the  persistence  of  external  reality  and  the  limitations  of  actual
humans.3 It is only by viewing the self as the product of both operations working jointly
that a full account of selfhood can be given. Perhaps because of this position, Peirce does
not use the term “self” in anything like a technical sense. In fact, he often equivocates in
his  employment  of  that  and  related  terms  like  “man.”  Consequently,  the  key  to
discovering Peirce’s model of the self is to approach his account by way of the related
concepts of consciousness, cognition, and personality, each of which Peirce does employ
in a technical fashion.
6 I  will  proceed, then, by tracing the development of selfhood as Peirce understands it
along the lines afforded by both aspects of his metaphysics, beginning with the biological
origins of consciousness (the condition for selfhood on the level of the species), and then
proceeding to his semiotic account of the cultural and linguistic formation of cognition
and “personality” (Peirce’s  favored term for those aspects of  selfhood which are not
reducible to biology alone). In doing this, I show that fallibilism is the crucial element in
both lines of development and reemerges as part of the organizing principle of the joint
workings of both processes.
 
III. The Evolution of Consciousness
7 In  Peirce’s  account,  the  selfhood  of  individuals  depends  upon  a  culturally-informed
development  of  a  species-wide  level  of  consciousness.  With  respect  to  the  biological
origins of consciousness, one passage which is of particular note is found in Peirce’s draft
for a 1904 book review titled “Nichol’s Cosmology and Pragmaticism.” In the following
selection from that paper, Peirce links the doctrines of fallibilism and synechism with the
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, (in both their phenomenological and
metaphysical applications) in a myth-like account of the development of consciousness.
As the majority of this manuscript has not been published, I will here quote the lengthy
passage in full:
Questioner: The narrowness of your view of reality only appears more and more
strikingly as you go on. You are, as you yourself well phrased it, simply color-blind
to the idea of existence in itself.
Pragmaticist: Hylozoism, the doctrine that all matter feels, is an idle and senseless
apology  for  a  theory  as  long  as  there  is  no  way  of  bringing  it  to  the  test  of
experiment;  but as soon as such a way shall  be found it will  become a working
hypothesis  particularly  well  worth  trying.  Meantime,  we  have  no  difficulty  in
conceiving some being (call it by the name of amoeba, just to help the imagination)
to have consciousness without the least trace of memory of any consciousness of
change, of any self, of any action or any relation, – whether of difference, similarity,
coexistence or of any sort whatsoever. It will have some quality of sentience, – say a
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solferino  color,  –  which  will  not  be  an  object  to  it,  but  a  tinge  of  its  life,  –
unrecognized, of course, since it will have no power of recognition. You may say, if
you chose to take that point of view, that in that solferino color the fancy-ameoba
has an immediate knowledge of the entire universe of being, with this most goodly
frame,  the  earth,  and  this  majestical  roof  fretted  with  golden  fire,  and  all.  So
considered,  it  is  a  knowledge  absolutely  flawless,  without  doubt,  gap,  or
imperfection and of the very kind that Leibniz attributes to Deity. It has perfectly
grasped the idea of pure being. Next, let us suppose that fancy-ameoba to undergo a
metamorphosis (to give it a name, say into a fancy-worm) in consequence of which
it is impelled from time to time to make conscious efforts, sometimes successful
and sometimes not, to change its solferino to emerald green and back again or to
resist spontaneous changes of this sort. It has a sense of the resistance. It feels the
effort,  a vague struggle for it  knows not what;  and this ceases upon success or,
without success, by fatigue; but it has no ideal of its purpose, and no comparing
power  whatsoever.  Though  it  has  no  sense  of  continuous  time,  it  is  aware  of
succeeding and of giving up. The poor creature is God no longer; its sense of actual
happening  has  made  it  a  finite  being.  You  see  what  I  am  driving  at:  I  am
endeavoring to create the idea of a being that, unlike our fancy-ameoba, should
virtually have the idea of existence or actuality, but without any trace of reason nor
the idea of pragmatistic reality. I call your attention to the circumstance that the
idea of sentiencial being which this fancy-ameoba virtually has (though of course it
has no general idea) is necessarily possessed by the fancy-worm as well; though he
has the virtual idea of existence and… (MS 329)4
8 Unfortunately,  this  portion  of  the  manuscript  ends  here.  We  can,  however,  make  a
reasonable  guess  as  to  how it  would continue,  enabled by Peirce’s  remarks  in  other
contexts;  this will  be attempted below. First,  we must unpack Peirce’s account of the
initial stages of the evolution of consciousness in this context.
 
IV. The “Fancy Amoeba”
9 After a brief remark about hylozoism, and an indication of how his own scientifically-
modeled hypothesis differs from that doctrine in its traditional form, Peirce asks us to
imagine  an  amoeba  with  certain  characteristics,  viz.  a  rudimentary  form  of
protoconsciousness deprived of any awareness of self, time and relation. This particular
amoeba, however, is given the curious qualification “fancy.” The term “fancy” can be
used to mean both the product of imaginative fantasy as well as to refer to animals which
have been selectively bred so as to develop certain features. Peirce’s use of the term here
fits both definitions. That is, he is both offering a mythical sort of thought experiment
meant to illustrate the evolution of consciousness but without any claims to its being a
true account of such development, as well as speculatively “breeding” organisms that
feature specific traits, viz. those that make up consciousness as we know it.
10 In his tale, Peirce connects doctrine of continuity with his triadic categories. The “fancy
ameoba’s” unrecognized, non-reflective “quality of sentience,” it’s “solferino color,” is an
example of Firstness.5 What is striking about this, however, is Peirce’s comment “that in
that solferino color the fancy-ameoba has an immediate knowledge of the entire universe
of being, with this most goodly frame, the earth, and this majestical roof fretted with
golden fire,  and all.”  That is,  through its  color the amoeba has “absolutely flawless”
knowledge of the universe that is entirely free from doubt. We can perhaps make more
sense of this seemingly hyperbolic claim by looking to a passage from “The Law of Mind.”
In that paper, Peirce applies his categories to a phenomenology of ideas: “Three elements
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go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic quality as a feeling. The second is the
energy with which it affects other ideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-
nowness of immediate sensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past. The third
element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it” (CP 6.135). These
three elements of an idea are another application of Peirce’s triadic system of categories,
the first being an instance of Firstness akin to the amoeba’s awareness of its solferino
color.  Later in “The Law of Mind,” Peirce further articulates what he takes this first
element to be: “The first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living feeling.
A continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but still embracing innumerable
parts, and also, though infinitesimal, entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in
its absence of boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt” (CP
6.138). In light of this earlier account, we can conclude that the amoeba’s “feeling” or
experience of the First which is its color gives it “immediate knowledge of the entire
universe of being” because such experience is not constrained by any limitation (internal
or external); the full possibility of generalization with respect to that feeling is present to
it. And, according to the “law of mind,” this generalizability is itself unlimited, and in fact
will continue to grow indefinitely (perhaps even infinitely). It is thus the counterpart in
the evolution of consciousness of the absolute potentiality Peirce locates at the beginning
of the evolution of the cosmos in A Guess at the Riddle (EP 1: 248).
 
V. The “Fancy Worm”
11 As  Peirce  continues  his  story  and  proceeds  up  the  evolutionary  ladder  from “fancy
amoeba” to “fancy worm,” the primary distinction is the introduction of error, i.e., the
failure of the fancy worm in some project that it is “impelled” to undertake (here the
changing of its color) but which is not guided by conscious purpose. In this, the fancy
worm has achieved the first requirement of consciousness, an awareness of the individual
self as finite and fallible, and exhibits Peirce’s category of Secondness: “The type of an
idea of Secondness is the experience of effort, prescinded from the idea of a purpose […]
The experience of effort cannot exist without the experience of resistance. Effort is only
effort by virtue of its being opposed” (CP 8.330). In effect, the fancy worm is not only
made aware of its finitude, but actually becomes a finite being through its sensing of the
resistance it encounters; according to Pierce, “its sense of actual happening has made it a
finite being.”
12 This  raises  the question,  however,  as  to  how this  is  indeed a  move “up” in Peirce’s
evolutionary scale. That is, if the “fancy amoeba” possessed a divine sort of knowledge,
how could the introduction of  finitude and fallibility be viewed as progress? Peirce’s
answer in both the Guess manuscript and the related material found in MS 955 turns upon
his distinguishing between reality and existence. For Peirce,  evolution in its broadest
form  models  the  universe  as  moving  from  a  point  in  the  infinite  past  which  is
characterized as one of absolute potentiality to a point, in the infinite future, of absolute
finality;  this is the development from absolute Firstness to absolute Secondness (EP1:
251). In MS 955, Peirce reiterates a version of this account, showing it to be a consequence
of the hypothesis that, rather than being absolute and static, laws grow:
If all things are continuous, the universe must be undergoing a continuous growth
from non-existence to existence. There is no difficulty in conceiving existence as a
matter  of  degree.  The  reality  of  things  consists  in  their  persistent  forcing
themselves upon our recognition. If a thing has no such persistence, it is a mere
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dream. Reality, then, is persistence, is regularity. In the original chaos, where there
was no regularity, there was no existence. It was all a confused dream. This we may
suppose was in the infinitely distant past. But as things are getting more regular,
more persistent, they are getting less dreamy and more real. (MS 955)
13 The account of the evolution of consciousness Peirce is telling in the story of the fancy
amoeba parallels the evolution put forth in his cosmology; thus, the move from fancy
amoeba  to  fancy  worm,  and  the  introduction  of  finitude  and  fallibility,  counts  as
evolutionary progress in that it is an instance of the universe’s “continuous growth from
non-existence to existence.” While a First is indeed “full of life and variety,” Peirce says,
“that  variety  is  only  potential;  it  is  not  definitely  there”  (W6:  181).  In  order  for
consciousness  to  truly  exist,  in  a  manner  that  is  not  epiphenomenal  but  rather
continuous with the rest of reality, it must, like everything else, enter into relations of
Secondness  and  be  a  persisting  thing  that  forces  recognition.  This  alone  will  make
consciousness part of the reality which corresponds to the final opinion, for “to say that a
thing is is to say that in the upshot of intellectual progress it will attain a permanent
status in the realm of ideas” (EP2: 2).
14 Peirce  has  thus  given  us  an  account  of  how  consciousness  can  arise  from  the
unpersonalized mind which underlies all reality. This is not, however, a sufficient account
of  personhood  or  the  human  self.  This  final  evolutionary  development  requires  the




15 Unfortunately,  the  extant  manuscript  ends  just  as  Peirce  is  prepared to  present  the
upshot  of  his  argument  and  extend  the  model  to  something  that  might  reasonably
correspond to the human self (the remainder of the manuscript consists primarily of
revised  versions  of  earlier,  unrelated,  passages).  This  is  typical  of  many  of  Peirce’s
manuscripts. As Josiah Royce noted, Peirce often becomes mired in his own speculation,
which may be the reason why he obsessively composed multiple drafts of the same papers
which were never completed. Royce complains that “one finds this tendency towards
what might be called ‘impenetrability’ especially evident in his manuscripts. Too often
the reader meets with a thought of surpassing brilliancy and follows it eagerly, only to
have it disappear like the cuttlefish in an inky blackness of its own secretion” (Royce &
Kernan 1916: 707).
16 We can, however, make a very reasonable guess as to how this particular story would
continue. The progression we see in this passage proceeds according to the model offered
by  Peirce’s  categories;  this  leaves,  then,  but  one  category  unaccounted  for,  namely
Thirdness. We can thus imagine the “fancy-worm” evolving, by way of the introduction of
Thirdness, into something possessing the sort of consciousness required for selfhood.
 
VII. Physiology and Three Forms of Consciousness
17 For  Peirce,  the  “activity  of  nerve-cells  is  the  main  physiological  requisite  for
consciousness” (W6: 189). Amoebae, as well as related “slime-moulds” and “protoplasm,”
do  “not  differ  in  any  radical  way  from the  contents  of  a  nerve-cell,  though  [their]
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functions  may be  less  specialized”  (CP 6.133).  This  is  because,  while  such organisms
cannot think, they do “feel,” and this sort of feeling is an element of consciousness.
18 In A Guess at the Riddle, Peirce identifies three abstracted elements of full consciousness:
“we have indubitably three radically different elements of consciousness, these and no
more. And they are evidently connected with the ideas of one – two – three. Immediate
feeling is the consciousness of the first; the polar sense is the consciousness of the second;
and synthetical consciousness is the consciousness of a Third or medium” (W6: 186). Here,
“feeling” (which he also calls “simple consciousness”) and “polar sense” (also called “dual
consciousness”) are abstractions that are attributed to the proto-consciousnesses of the
fancy  amoeba  and  worm,  respectively  (Peirce  calls  the  third  element  “synthetical
consciousness” or “cognition” and this was likely the subject of the rest of the passage
quoted from MS 329). Peirce approaches the third form of consciousness, i.e., “synthetical
consciousness,” by way of an analysis of the distinctive marks of cognition: “that element
of  cognition  which  is  neither  feeling  nor  the  polar  sense  [i.e.,  simple  or  dual
consciousness abstracted from cognition], is the consciousness of a process, and this in
the  form  of  the  sense  of  learning,  of  acquiring,  of  mental  growth  is  eminently
characteristic of cognition […] This is the consciousness that binds our life together. It is
the  consciousness  of  synthesis”  (EP1:  260).  In  identifying  cognition  (the  type  of
consciousness required for self-hood) with synthesis, Peirce is laying the foundation for
his characterization of the self as a Third or sign, the product of an irreducibly triadic
relation of mediation.
19 It is this synthetical consciousness which introduces the possibility of self-consciousness
and the growth of the self, for
the highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither by the
inward  attractions  of  the  feelings  or  representations  themselves,  nor  by  a
transcendental force or haecceity, but in the interest of intelligibility, that is, in the
interest of the synthesizing “I think” itself; and this it does by introducing an idea
not contained in the data, which gives connections which they would not otherwise
have had. (EP1: 261)
20 Such a  consciousness  is  not  restricted to  experience the world through sensation of
qualities or feelings, as did the fancy amoeba through its solferino color, or by way of
determined action to which resistance is sensed, as in the case of the fancy worm. Owing
to its mediating capacities,  this form of consciousness is able to form plans of action
according  to  purposes  (rather  than  the impelled  action  of  the  worm),  interpret  the
general habits observed in the outcomes of such actions, and articulate general ideas to
account for these regularities.
21 Cognition,  or  synthetical  consciousness,  then,  embodies  the  phenomenological
application of Thirdness. It is not only capable of experiencing feeling, and reacting to the
impingement of brute reality, but is also equipped with the means by which to unify both
action and sensation and relate these back to past experiences as well as project them
into the future. This unity is achieved through the adoption of a purpose and is made
possible by language and community. The progression from the first to the second stage
of the evolution (from “fancy amoeba” to “fancy worm”) occurred as a result  of  the
organism becoming implicitly aware of resistance. However, that organism still lacked
the capacity to discursively reflect on its own finitude and limitation; as Peirce says, it is
aware, merely, of attempting some action and, on occasion, failing in its execution. The
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third stage, however, involves not only this awareness but also a reflective consciousness
of itself as being inherently limited.
22 Peirce will continue the line of speculation he pursues in the incomplete passage drawn
from MS 329, eventually developing the phenomenological application of the categories
into  what  he  calls  three  “Universes  of  Experience.”  In  his  late  paper  “A  Neglected
Argument for the Reality of God,” (1908), he offers the following characterization of these
“universes”:
Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere
Ideas,  those  airy  nothings  to  which  the  mind  of  poet,  pure  mathematician,  or
another might give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-
nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought,
not in anybody’s actually thinking them, save their Reality. The second Universe is
that  of  the Brute  Actuality  of  things  and facts.  I  am confident  that  their  Being
consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable
until they are closely and fairly examined. The third Universe comprises everything
whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different
objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which
is essentially a Sign, – not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such,
but,  so to speak,  the Sign’s Soul,  which has its  Being in its  power of serving as
intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness,
and such the life, the power of growth of a plant. Such is a living institution, – a
daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social “movement.” (EP 2: 435)
23 In  light  of  this  formulation,  we  can see  that  the  organisms  described  in  Peirce’s
evolutionary  myth each inhabit  one  of  the  three  universes  of  experience:  the  fancy
amoeba belongs to the first,  the realm of “mere Ideas”;  the fancy worm inhabits the
second,  “that  of  Brute  Actuality”;  and the  synthetical  consciousness,  per  hypothesis,
occupies  the  realm  of  mediation  made  possible  by  semiosis.  This  consciousness  is,
therefore, itself a sign. Given that Peirce understands the term “sign” in a very general
sense (perhaps too general, some have argued), this puts “living consciousness” on the
same level as growth in nature (Peirce uses the example of a plant) as well as cultural
artifacts such as texts and even larger Intentional structures such as the “spirit of an age”
or  Peirce’s  own  example  of  a  “social  ‘movement’.”  Human  consciousness  cannot  be
reduced  to  its  biological  features  because  “synechism  recognizes  that  the  carnal
consciousness is but a small part of the man. There is, in the second place, the social
consciousness, by which a man’s spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live
and breathe and have its being very much longer than superficial observers think” (EP2:
3). Peirce thus connects human consciousness with non-human nature as well as with
cultural practices and artifacts. This is the heart of his non-reductive naturalism, in its
most mature development taking the form of a semiotic model.
24 The  question  arises,  however,  as  to  what,  exactly,  makes  cognition  possible.  It  is
important to note that Peirce understands cognition as both continuous with biological
evolution and necessarily embodied, although not reducible to either. In a 1906 attempt
at a proof for pragmatism, he says that,
By  an  experience  of  active  effort  is  meant  what  is  in  the  mind  (and  a  less
determinate phrase would be used if any were forthcoming) upon the contraction
of a voluntary muscle, minus all idea of ulterior purpose, all sensations referred to
the muscle that is contracted or to other parts of the body and all that is otherwise
plainly  no  part  of  the  conscious  effort.  A  person  may  opine  that  after  those
subtractions  nothing  will  remain  in  consciousness;  nor  will  he  thereby  by  any
means convict himself of being a bad observer. Nevertheless, such an opinion is
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erroneous. The sense of effort is the sense of an opposing resistance then and there
present. It is entirely different from purpose, which is the idea of a possible general
regarded as desirable together with a sense of being determined in one’s habitual
nature (in one’s soul, if you like that expression; it is that part of our nature which
makes general determinations of conduct) to actualize it. (EP2: 383-4)
25 What distinguishes cognition, and prevents it from being accounted for purely in terms of
biological  evolution,  is  its  inherent  purposiveness.  Peirce  characterizes  this
purposiveness in terms of the self’s being able to embody general ideas in actual contexts.
In fact, such is the “proper function” of evolved humans: “Animals of all races rise far
above the general level of their intelligence in those performances that are their proper
function,” he says in a later paper, “such as flying and nest-building for ordinary birds;
and what is man’s proper function if it be not to embody general ideas in art-creations, in
utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition?” (EP 2: 443).
26 A human self is able to perform such a mediating function because it is itself a product of
such mediation, in the form of semiosis, i.e., “an action, or influence which is, or involves,
a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-
relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs” (EP 2: 411).
Synthetical consciousness is the product of such semiosis and this is what will enable the
truly unique characteristics of  human selves,  their capacity to interpret and produce
interactions with an environment with respect to ideal purposes. That is, they are able to
act in meaningful ways in the sense Wittgenstein illustrates with his famous question in
§621 of his Philosophical Investigations. That the self is part of semiosis, i.e., a Sign, is one of
Peirce’s earliest doctrines, explored in detail already in the “Cognition Series” of papers
of 1868-9.
 
VIII. Childhood Development and Self-Consciousness
27 Peirce’s  story  about  the  evolution  of  consciousness,  which  parallels  his  evolutionary
cosmology, is itself paralleled in an account of childhood development which he gives in
one of his earliest papers, “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man.”
Initially,  Peirce says,  a  child is  focused solely on its  own body and the sensations it
produces. “Only what it touches has any actual and present feeling; only what it faces has
any actual color; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste” (W2: 201). This parallels
the limited consciousness of the fancy amoeba, i.e., a phenomenological manifestation of
Firstness.  This  focus  on  the  body  soon  leads  the  child  to  discover  that  changes  in
environment are often dependent upon contact with that body which is the center of its
universe, and its ability to act on things which in turn react to it. This is analogous to the
more  developed  consciousness  of  the  fancy  worm  and  introduces  the  child  to  the
phenomenological experience of Secondness. The crucial step which follows is the child’s
acquisition of a language, which Peirce says occurs by way of instinct and imitation.6 This
parallels the move from fancy worm to a being with cognition, as described above. “It
must be about this time,” Peirce says, “that he begins to find that what these people
about him say is the very best evidence of fact. So much so, that testimony is even a
stronger mark of fact than the facts themselves, or rather than what must now be thought
of as the appearances themselves. (I may remark, by the way, that this remains so through
life; testimony will convince a man that he himself is mad)” (W2: 202). The child soon
learns that experience tends to confirm the testimony of others more often than his own
beliefs or apprehension of phenomena.
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28 “Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this
ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness” (W2:
202). This leads Peirce to his famous characterization of the individual self in terms of its
fallibility: error “can only be explained by supposing a self  which is fallible” which is
manifested by its departure from the more reliable judgments of testimony (W2: 203).
Consequently, “Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the
absolute ego of pure apperception” (W2: 203).
29 We can make better sense of the importance of this claim with a little help from a lecture
on Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception delivered by Royce. In that lecture, Royce
identifies several  “characteristic thoughts” of  Kant’s deduction of  the categories.  The
fourth of these, he claims,
is  the  thought  that  we conceive all  our  experience  as  unified,  as  connected,  as
interrelated,  in  so  far  as  we  view  the  whole  realm  of  knowable  facts  as  the
experience of one virtual self whose time and space forms, whose categories, whose
data of knowledge, whose possible experiences, form the topic with which all our
sciences are busied […] The knowable world is the realm of the possible experience
of this virtual self to whose one experience we inevitably refer any natural fact.
(Royce 1919: 34-35)
30 Royce emphasizes that this unity remains a virtual self for Kant, and that it is only with
later  German  idealists  that  it  is  given  a  real  existence  as  a  sort  of  social  selfhood.
According to this  Kantian line of  thought,  something is  needed in order to unify all
possible experience and thereby grant objectivity to the various subjective experiences of
individuals. This virtual self furnishes the conditions for knowledge which enable and
determine every individual’s possible experience insofar as we all share a common world
of phenomena. Peirce’s claim, then, is that we are, as individuals, distinguished from this
“self” which unifies all possible experience only insofar as we depart from it, in terms of
error and ignorance.
31 This leads Peirce to a characterization of selfhood that places particular emphasis on the
community to which it belongs. In a short piece for the journal The Open Court, which was
intended as a summary of his synechistic philosophy geared towards a popular audience,
he makes this point clear and draws conclusions that may at first appear quite bizarre.
The synechist, Peirce says, must never say,
“I am altogether myself, and not at all you.” If you embrace synechism, you must
abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. In the first place, your neighbors are, in a
measure,  yourself,  and  in  far  greater  measure  than,  without  deep  studies  in
psychology, you would believe. Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself
is, for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men
who resemble you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a measure, yourself,
though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors are you. (EP2: 2)
32 For  Peirce,  then,  the  self  as  sign  and  embodiment  of  ideas  can  only  exist  within  a
community of other selves (this point is particularly important in Royce’s development of
Peirce’s philosophy). This model is in contrast with a more widespread characterization
of  the self  which owes much to the Cartesian picture Peirce’s  early  papers  criticize.
Douglas  Anderson  characterizes  such  a  Cartesian  self  as  “a  substantive,  isolated
individual existing in a web of mechanical causes” and contrasts it with “Peirce’s realistic,
synechistic,  and semiotic conception of  the self” (Anderson 2006:  163).  The Cartesian
model  understands  the  self  primarily  in  terms  of  its  agency  and  atomicity  and
understands words and other signs as externalized expressions of subjective intention;
From Fancy Amoeba to Fallible Self
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-1 | 2010
10
they  have  meaning  insofar  as  some  agent  or  agents  impart  meaning  to  them.  The
prevalence of this account of the self is clear in twentieth century analytic philosophy of
art,  especially  arguments  surrounding interpretation.  A common assumption in  such
discussions is that artifacts are meaningful structures only insofar as a creative agent can
be credited with their production. Thus, a “wave poem” – i.e., what appear to be words
written in  the  sand by  the  movement  of  waves  –  only counts  as  a  poem if  it  were
produced by an agent who intended to write a poem.7 For Peirce, such a model of is
merely another instance of the nominalism he opposes throughout his career. To say that
signs are only meaningful  insofar as  we grant them meaning is  to make them mere
names,  and  thus  discount  the  reality  of  generals.  What’s  more,  it  gets  the  order  of
evolution backwards. For Peirce, semiosis precedes selfhood – selves are but parts of that
process which comprises the mind underlying all of reality. This is the crux of Peirce’s
naturalism; “all communication from mind to mind is through continuity of being,” he
says (EP 2: 3), and “all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in
a more or less regular way” (CP 6.268).
33 Thus, the fallibilist characterization of the self as the locus of error and ignorance, which
at first appears to be merely negative, reveals itself to be an important and positive model
in at least three ways: first, it motivates inquiry, experimentation and the embodiment of
ideas. It does this by introducing and universal sort of doubt and “existential” crisis with
respect to truth and inquiry. Peirce places truth at the end of infinite inquiry; as such, it
is beyond the grasp of any individual or community within finite time. Given that we can
never know whether or not any given belief  or accepted fact forms part of the final
opinion, we must view all human inquiry as inherently fallible, admitting that any belief
or body of accepted knowledge could be wrong, even radically so. If truth as a concept is
defined in such a way that it can never be practically attained by any finite inquirer, then
a sort of universal irritation of doubt is introduced. Thus, the actual, finite inquirer is
always confronted with an objective uncertainty, or “anxiety,” if you will, regarding his
or her attempts at reaching a true account. As David Savan argues, in the absence of such
doubt, reason itself ceases to exist:
The perfect and complete knowledge of the ideal community would be the death of
reason. What such an ideally knowledgeable community affirmed would necessarily
exist, and what it denied would necessarily not be. The distinction between truth
and falsehood, reality and illusion, would disappear […] A world entirely without a
spark  of  chance-spontaneity  would  be crystalline,  perfectly  rigid,  and  perfectly
dead. (Savan 1965: 49)
34 Second, understanding the self as a locus of error and ignorance is necessary in order for
reasons  to  have  the  normative  force  they  do.  Initiation  into  language,  and  the
accompanying  realization  that  testimony  is  a  greater  authority  even  than  personal
experience, is initiation into something bigger than the self, a world that can rightfully
make demands and offer justifications (rather than mere exculpations).8 Finally, a model
of  selfhood  based  on  the  idea of  fallibilism,  which  itself  becomes  the  doctrine  of
synechism  when  “objectified,”  bridges  the  gap  between  this  world  of  reasons  and
justifications and the material world (CP 1.171). In Peirce’s words, “viewing a thing from
the outside, considering its relations of action and reaction with other things, it appears
as matter. Viewing it from the inside, looking at its immediate character as feeling, it
appears as consciousness” (CP 6.268).
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IX. Personality
35 Peirce’s guess at the sphynx’s riddle about “the meaning of man,” is, in its simplest form,
semiosis.  In  our  own  experience  (and  thus  the  only  known  manifestation  of  such
cognition) this takes the form of language. In an unpublished manuscript, Peirce says
By a ‘person,’ by the way, I suppose we mean an animal that has command of some
syn- tactical language, since we neither call any of the lower animals persons, (for,
though  they  be  able  to  convey  their  meanings  by  various  sounds,  they  do  not
combine different sounds so as to build sentences,) nor do we call an infant that
cannot yet put two words together to make a sentence. One might almost define a
person as an animal possessed of moral self-control; but that would not be correct
unless  we  were  prepared  to  call  some  dogs,  horses,  parrots,  hens,  and  other
creatures persons,  which I  take it  nobody does,  in spite of the moral respect to
which they are often well-entitled. One feels that there is an injustice in our non-
expression of  respect  for them. Yet,  after  all,  the word person,  p|e|r|s|o|n|a,  has
explicit reference to speech. (MS 659, as cited in Lane 2009: 20)
36 Robert Lane has recently offered a Peircean-inspired account of selves that draws heavily
on this passage. For Lane, “a person is an animal whose nervous system functions in a
specific way, viz. to engage in a continuous process of sign-interpretation” (Lane 2009: 8).
Lane makes it clear that he does not intend for this to be a definition of personhood, but
only a partial and rough characterization of it; something more is needed to account for
the sui generis nature of human personhood. This is evident when we look to organisms
like bees, a case that Peirce himself famously treats.
37 Honeybees are,  as is  well-known, capable of  a form of communication,  what is  often
referred  to  as  “dancing,”  which  fits  Peirce’s  description  of  semiosis:  the  significant
movements of an individual bee (a sign) represent the location, distance and nature of a
pollen, nectar or water source (an object) than can be interpreted by other bees who will
follow that direction to the target (an interpretant). Consequently, honeybees are animals
whose  nervous  systems  function  in  such  a  ways  as  to  enable  them to  engage  sign-
production  and  interpretation,  as  in  Lane’s  characterization  of  a  person.  However,
honeybees are not taken to be persons in the same sense as when we ascribe the term to
human selves.  Part  of  Lane’s  motivation  for  focusing  on  the  animal  embodiment  of
human persons is that he takes this to be the essential factor in the individuation of
selves. “Persons are individuated from each other by being individual animals, just as
different copies of Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed are individuated from each other by being
different bound volumes” (Lane 2009: 11). The honeybee example highlights the extent to
which  this  account  of  individuality  must  be  augmented,  for,  while  each  bee  is  an
“individual  animal”  which  engages  in  sign-making  and  interpretation,  it  is  not  an
“individual” in the sense of the term as applied to human persons, a sense that goes
beyond numerical differentiation. In fact, what is most intriguing about the honeybees in
this context is that they display none of the characteristics of individuality that figure
prominently in our intuitions about and treatments of human persons; so much so that
we are often led to speak of a “hive mind” of which each bee is merely a part and thus
displays very little in the way of an individual mind (a potentially essential characteristic
of personhood). We see, then, that not only is something more needed to distinguish
human cognition from incipient forms of consciousness in the animal world, but also to
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distinguish  human  persons  as  individuals  (in  the  strong  sense  captured  in  ethical
discourse) from their fellows.
38 Peirce is concerned with this element of selfhood from the very beginning of his career,
and addresses it in the 1866 Lowell lecture which emphasizes the similarities between
people and words.
Each man has his own peculiar character.  It  enters into all  he does.  It  is  in his
consciousness and not a mere mechanical trick, and therefore it is by the principles
of the last lecture a cognition; but as it enters into all his cognition, it is a cognition
of things in general. It is therefore the man’s philosophy, his way of regarding things;
not a philosophy of the head alone – but one which pervades the whole man. This
idiosyncrasy is the idea of the man; and if this idea is true he lives forever; if false,
his individual soul has but a contingent existence. (CP 7.595)
39 This passage prefigures much of what Peirce will later say about the self, including the
“immortality” he is willing to attribute to persons as well as his theory of truth as the
final opinion. The “peculiar character” he describes is the positive element of his model
of the self, what he elsewhere refers to as “personality.”
40 According to Peirce, “personality is some kind of coördination or connection of ideas”
(EP1:  331).  Not  just  any  arrangement  of  “conceptions  working  together”  produces  a
personality; the parts of this species of mind must be “coordinated in a particular way.”
Moreover, “the word coordination […] implies a teleological harmony of ideas, and in the
case  of  personality  this  teleology  is  more  than  a  mere  purposive  pursuit  of  a
predeterminate end; it is a developmental teleology. This is personal character. A general
idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in the future to an
extent to which it is not now conscious” (EP1: 331). Peirce’s invocation of teleology here is
telling. Teleology, for Peirce, is always connected with the idea of the infinite, and the
goal of any such development is never available to actual inquirers in finite time. It is not
epiphenomenal; we do carry with us the “freightage of eternity” (EP 2: 449), but we can
never know it or even know that we are actually approaching closer toward it at any
given moment.9 For this reason, “personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be
apprehended in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it in
all its fullness” (EP 1: 331).
41 Moreover, this “living in time” of personality reveals the reciprocal evolution of human
selves and the general ideas they embody.
Something of the general nature of personality there is in all general ideas. These
conceptions  are  in  a  certain  sense  creations  of  the  human  intelligence,  but  in
another  aspect  the  human  mind  is  the  creation  of  these  conceptions  working
together. These general conceptions are no figments, they are real things – more
than  that,  they  are  living  beings  with  something  like  life  and  something  like
personality. Mind acts upon mind by virtue of its continuity; and this continuity
involves generality. (MS 954)
42 The reality of generals or ideas in this context comes down to the recognition that, while
such culturally significant structures are indeed constructions, they are essential to the
emergence of persons, contributing to our existence as selves equally as much as the
forces of biology and physics fashion our embodied existence. The importance of Peirce’s
synthesized  metaphysics  is  in  drawing  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  full  account  of
personhood is impossible without attending to both aspects of the development of the
self,  i.e.,  the biological and the culturally significant. This is by no means an entirely
novel conception; the insight might be traced back to the sophists of fifth-century Athens
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who, as Sarah Broadie puts it, came to the “dual realization” of “our power of logos [which
variously  means  ‘speech,’  ‘language,’  ‘argument,’  ‘reason’]  and  its  power  over  us”
(Broadie 2003: 75).10
43 The conclusion this leads us to is that human persons or selves are artifacts of cultural,
brought about by the semiosis  of  language but in a way that is  continuous with the
evolution of the “natural” world. This “natural artifactuality” is the alternative to the
natural-artificial distinction which has dominated most discussions of the self.11
44 To understand Peirce’s account of actual human selves, then, requires analysis of two
concepts  that,  despite  their  close  affinity  to  mind  and  consciousness,  Peirce  keeps
somewhat distinct. The first is self-consciousness and the second, personality. Bringing
all  three  (Mind,  self-consciousness  and  personality)  together  gives  us  a  reasonable
account of Peirce’s model of the self; however, the third element, personality, remains
largely unexplained within Peirce’s own work. In order to better understand its nature
and function requires, I argue, a turn to Royce’s development of this and related Peircean
concepts. Such an analysis extends, of course, well beyond the scope of this paper, but is
assuredly a fruitful one.
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NOTES
1. The brackets enclose a note added by Peirce in the margin of the letter.
2. I  draw  the  term  “Darwinianized  Hegelism”  from  one  of  Peirce’s  own  works,  a  review  of
David G. Ritchie’s book, Darwin and Hegel with Other Philosophical Studies, written for The Nation. At
the end of the review, Peirce speculates about a promising direction for philosophy that draws on
his fallibilist theory of truth and inquiry and which captures intuitions put forth by both Darwin
and Hegel (as Peirce understood each). Here is the passage in question: An a-priori philosophy
ought not to pronounce in advance upon the truth of anything which is capable of verification or
refutation by subsequent experience. But beyond the realm of verification truth and falsity lose
their  meanings.  Hence the moment a  philosopher,  upon a-priori  or  epistemological  grounds,
enunciates any proposition whatever as true, we are warned to be upon our guard against some
jugglery.  Where we have no scientifically observed facts to go upon,  the prudent thing is  to
confess our downright ignorance. Even where we have such facts, we are subject to a probable
error.  From  this  pregnant  fact,  if  one  only  takes  it  to  heart,  can  be  developed  a  whole
Darwinianized  Hegelism,  having  fruitful  suggestions  and  indications  for  the  prosecution  of
science and for the conduct of life (Peirce 1975-87: 201-2).
3. Cf. W 6: 180.
4. References to Peirce’s unpublished manuscripts follow (Robin 1967).
5. It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that,  when  reference  to  a  specific  color  is  required  by  the
discussion, Peirce almost invariably chooses a shade of red. I am reluctant to speculate at this
point as to whether this indicates anything other than personal preference, but given that Peirce
does favor the color so greatly in his writing, it is perhaps a line of inquiry worth pursuing.
6. Cf. EP 2: 443.
7. For detailed discussions of these, and related issues, see Isenminger 1992.
8. For a useful account of the difference, from a different perspective, see McDowell 1996.
9. Cf. CP 1.141.
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10. The material enclosed in square brackets is Broadie’s own gloss of the Greek term “logos.”
11. The term “natural  artifact”  is  borrowed from the work of  Joseph Margolis  and Marjorie
Grene. See, especially, (Margolis 2009: 26-7) and (Grene 1974: 358).
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